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I will defend the claim that we need to differentiate between thinking and reasoning in or-
der to make progress in understanding the intricate relation between language and mind. 
The distinction between thinking and reasoning will allow us to apply a structural equivalent 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument to the domain of mind and language. 
This argumentative strategy enables us to show that and how a certain subcategory of cog-
nitive processes, namely reasoning, is constitutively dependent on language. The final out-
come and claim of this paper can be summarized as follows: We can think without language, 
but we cannot reason without language. While this still leaves several questions about the 
relation between mind and language unanswered, I hold that the insights defended in this 
paper provide the basis and proper framework for further investigation about the relation-
ship between language and the mind.
Keywords: Private language argument, Wittgenstein, thought/mind and language, reason-
ing, linguistic relativity, non-linguistic cognition.
RESUMO
Defenderei que precisamos diferenciar pensamento e raciocínio a fim de progredir na com-
preensão da intrincada relação entre mente e linguagem. A distinção entre pensamento e 
raciocínio nos permitirá aplicar um argumento estruturalmente equivalente ao Argumento 
da Linguagem Privada de Ludwig Wittgenstein ao domínio da mente e da linguagem. Essa 
estratégia argumentativa nos permite mostrar que, e como, determinada subcategoria de 
processos cognitivos, a saber, o raciocínio, é constitutivamente dependente da linguagem. 
O resultado final e a tese deste artigo podem ser resumidos da seguinte forma: Podemos 
pensar sem linguagem, mas não podemos raciocinar sem linguagem. Embora isso ainda 
deixe várias questões sobre a relação mente e linguagem não respondidas, sustento que 
as ideias defendidas neste artigo fornecem uma base e uma estrutura adequada para uma 
investigação posterior sobre a relação entre a linguagem e a mente.
Palavras-chave: Argumento da linguagem privada, Wittgenstein, pensamento/mente e lin-
guagem, raciocínio, relatividade linguística, cognição não-linguística.
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Introduction
When we ask about the relation between thought and 
language, or language and the mind, we can demarcate pos-
sible answers to this question along a sp ectrum. On the one 
end of this sp ectrum we find a position which has come to be 
known as the conduit metaphor (Reddy, 1993). I think, pace 
Carruthers (2002, p. 657), that it is fair to charact erize this 
position as the “common sense” view about how thought and 
language are related (see Ahearn, 2017, p. 8). It roughly tells 
us that thought is independent of language, since language 
merely serves to communicate our language-independently 
premolded thoughts to others. In order to communicate, we 
need to “translate” our thoughts into a public language; but 
language has no impact whatsoever on thought, since think-
ing is prior to and independent of language.
On the other end of the spectrum we find various 
positions which fall under the umbrella term “linguistic 
relativity.” Proponents of linguistic relativity theories often 
appeal to the early 20th century linguists Edward Sapir and 
especially Benjamin Lee Whorf, and base their accounts 
on what has come to be known as the Sapir-Whorf hy-
pothesis.3 Different versions of the theory postulate vari-
ous kinds and intensities of linguistic impact on thinking. 
But all varieties of linguistic relativity insist on a substan-
tial effect of language on thought, including radical ver-
sions according to which the language we speak essentially 
determines how we perceive reality, and the thoughts of 
speakers of structurally very different languages become 
basically incommensurable.4
I am convinced that truth is not to be found at either 
extreme of this sp ectrum, but it is one thing to claim that we 
need to find a tenable middle ground, and a very different 
thing to carve out and argue for a convincing position. My 
aim in this paper is to make a case for the claim that language 
does indeed have a substantial impact on the mind – since 
a certain kind of conscious cognitive processes, namely rea-
soning, constitutively depends on language – but no form of 
linguistic relativity whatsoever follows from this.
The line of argument I wish to present is closely related 
to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous Private Language Argument. 
I will start with a short reminder of what Wittgenstein’s Pri-
vate Language Argument is (section 1.1), before providing 
a reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s argument (section 1.2), 
which I call “PLA”.5 In a next step, I will sketch a distinction 
between thinking and reasoning (section 2), which needs 
to be drawn among conscious cognitive processes. This dis-
tinction is necessary before Wittgenstein’s rationale can be 
applied to the domain of mind and language. This is what I 
will do in section 3, where I present a Private Reasoning Ar-
gument – PRA for short – which is constructed in close anal-
ogy with PLA. If the Private Reasoning Argument is cogent, 
it gives a direct – although not exhaustive – answer to the 
question how mind and language are related. PRA rests on a 
controversial premise, which will be (incompletely) defended 
in section 4. Section 5 delineates my account from linguistic 
relativity, before addressing a prominent concern about Witt-
genstein’s argument – namely verificationism – in section 6. 
Finally, section 7 sp ells out some consequences of PRA, before 
the big picture of my account is quickly summarized in the 
conclusion section.
1. The Private Language 
Argument
While Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argu-
ment tells us that a private language cannot exist, it also 
points us towards the conclusion that private reasoning 
cannot exist, because reasoning is dependent on language. 
To understand why, we must first unpack the Private Lan-
guage Argument before this consequence can be drawn 
and contextualized in the debate about mind and lan-
guage. For the purpose at hand, no deep exegetical investi-
gation into §§243-315 of Wittgenstein’s (2009) Philosoph-
ical Investigations, which are commonly held to comprise 
the Private Language Argument, is needed. The following 
short introduction to the Private Language Argument is 
just meant to provide a rough outline of the argument in 
order to get a clear enough grasp on its functioning, so the 
subsequent reconstruction (PLA) and the later application 
to the relation between mind and language (PRA) can be 
more readily understood.
In order to roughly position my reading of the rele-
vant paragraphs in Wittgenstein (2009) I would nonethe-
less be willing to state that I loosely follow Norman Mal-
colm’s (1954) take on Wittgenstein’s reasoning, which I 
even dare to call the standard or traditional interpretation 
of the Private Language Argument. Be that as it may, since 
the reconstruction I present below (i.e. PLA) is meant to 
be a deductively valid argument with the conclusion that 
a private language is impossible, my take on Wittgenstein’s 
Private Language Argument certainly qualifies as a repre-
sentative of what is usually called “the orthodox approach to 
private language” (Stern, 2011, p. 334). I will sketch the basic 
rationale of the Private Language Argument in the following 
3 The literature about linguistic relativity and the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is extremely vast, but for a good and rather recent overview 
see Reines and Prinz (2009).
4 For more on linguistic relativity, see section 5.
5 My reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s argument will be referred to as “PLA” throughout this text, whereas my usage of the expression 
“Private Language Argument” indicates that I do not talk about my particular interpretation and reconstruction of the argument, but 
about the argument more generally, usually disregarding differences in exegesis and interpretation.
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section 1.1, and subsequently attach a reconstruction there-
of in explicitly canonical form in section 1.2.6
1.1 General Depiction
A language is private, in Wittgenstein’s sense, just in case 
it principally cannot be learned or understood by anyone but 
a single sp eaker. This is because the expressions of a private 
language would refer to a sp eaker’s private experiences, which 
are essentially not accessible to anyone but the sp eaker.7 Since 
no one but the sp eaker could possibly know the reference/
meaning of these expressions, no one but the sp eaker could 
consequently understand the language.
Language is here conceived of as (inter alia) a system 
of rules, and therefore mastering a language is mastering its 
rules. This presupposes intersubjectivity, since without pub-
licly available standards for determining when a rule is fol-
lowed or not, the entire institution of rule-following breaks 
down. In other words, without publicly available standards 
everything that seems right for a sp eaker will be right. With-
out a distinction between what merely seems right and what 
actually is right, any distinction between right and not right 
gets abandoned as well.
A private language would not allow for the distinction 
between actually following a rule and the mere impression 
of following a rule, because there is in principle no way for a 
sp eaker to double-check whether she indeed followed a rule 
correctly, or whether it just seems to her that she did. But if 
this distinction between actually and allegedly following a 
rule is not available for a sp eaker, we are not even dealing with 
a language at all. Mastering a language comes down to mas-
tering a set of rules. But without any possibility to discrim-
inate between successful and unsuccessful applications of a 
rule, there is no mastering of rules. Therefore, every possible 
language must be a public language.
1.2 Reconstruction PLA
In an attempt to explicitly state the Private Language Argu-
ment in canonical form, I propose the following reconstruction:
PLA: The Private Language Argument reconstructed8
L1* A (natural) language is (inter alia) a system of rules 
that can be mastered.
L2* A (natural) language can only be mastered if its rules 
can be mastered.
L3* Rules can only be mastered if it is possible to draw a 
distinction between correct and incorrect applications of a rule.
L4 A (natural) language can only be mastered if it is pos-
sible to draw a distinction between correct and incorrect appli-
cations of its rules. [via hypothetical syllogism from L2 and L3].
L5* A private language would not allow drawing the dis-
tinction between correctly and incorrectly applied rules.
L6 A private language cannot be mastered. [via modus 
tollens from L4 and L5].
L7 Therefore, a private language is not a possible (natu-
ral) language. [via modus tollens from L1 and L6].
L8 Therefore, every possible language is a public (i.e. 
non-private) language. [via contraposition from L7].
Premises L1 and L2 should be rather unproblematic. 
The gist of Wittgenstein’s reasoning is contained in premises 
L3 and L5, which are the critical assumptions needed to get 
PLA working. The rationale behind those crucial premises 
is the claim that we cannot follow a rule in private, i.e. the 
rule-following constraint (Wittgenstein, 2009, § 202).
2. Thinking vs. Reasoning
A variation of this argument yields the conclusion that 
private reasoning is just as impossible as a private language, 
granted, of course, that PLA is successful. As a first step to 
apply PLA’s rationale to the relation between language and 
the mind, we need to make a distinction between two proper 
subsets of thought in a rather broad understanding:9 The dis-
tinction is between reasoning on the one hand, and all kinds 
of thinking which are not reasoning on the other hand. So, 
reasoning and thinking are mutually exclusive, while they are 
both kinds of (and together exhaust) conscious thought.
It might be tempting, at first glance, to equate the distinc-
tion between thinking and reasoning with Daniel Kahneman’s 
(2013) distinction between System 1 and System 2. In some 
resp ects, Kahneman’s widely used distinction comes close 
to the differentiation I aim at: System 1 works automatically 
6 Since explicit reconstructions of the Private Language Argument seem to be surprisingly rare in the literature, what I provide below 
is my own reconstruction which clearly marks assumptions and inferential relations among individual propositions (i.e. what I call “ca-
nonical form”). The only other reconstruction of the Private Language Argument I know, which also provides these features, is Wrisley’s 
(2011, p. 353 f), which unfortunately sticks too closely to the original text and is therefore too convoluted to carve out the underlying 
rationale in a helpful way.
7 This is, at least, what Wittgenstein’s famous example of the diary case (Wittgenstein, 2009, §258) and other passages (e.g. §§243, 256 f, 
268, 275, and 293) suggest. But note that in the subsequent reconstruction of the Private Language Argument in section 1.2 no use 
whatsoever is made of the alleged privacy of what is designated by a linguistic expression. This is an advantage because PLA is therefore 
open for and applicable to other conceivable forms of language which are also private, albeit for different reasons than speaking about 
private sensations (Bertolet, 1999, p. 741). It might be possible to read Wittgenstein (2009, §§259 and 269) as encouraging such a wider 
notion of a private language.
8 The asterisk (*) marks assumptions.
9 We may call this a Cartesian notion of thought (comprising whatever one can be consciously aware of), which covers “any sort of con-
scious state or activity whatsoever” (Williams, 2005, p. 62).
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and without conscious effort for the cognizer, just as the kind 
of cognitive processes I wish to call “thinking” here. System 2 
is slow and effortful, often even arduous from a first-person 
persp ective, just as reasoning is supposed to be. Furthermore, 
thought and System 1 are both intuitive, while reasoning and 
System 2 demand training and concentration. But Kahneman’s 
distinction and my differentiation between thinking and rea-
soning come apart in at least one central resp ect.
The crucial difference between thinking and reasoning 
is that the latter, in contrast to the former, is subject to cor-
rectness conditions (and presupposes rule-following). These 
correctness conditions can be thought of in analogy with the 
conditions an argument needs to fulfill in order to be valid.10
The applicability of correctness conditions is orthogonal to 
Kahneman’s distinction, because e.g. causal reasoning – which 
is done by System 1 – has correctness conditions just as do 
mathematical, statistical, or logical reasoning, which fall un-
der the domain of System 2. The notion of reasoning which 
is of interest here may be called “System ≥ 1.5 reasoning” 
(McHugh; Way, 2018, p. 193) or “reasoning that is System 
1.5 and up” (Boghossian, 2014, p. 2), i.e. reasoning that is per-
son-level (Hurley; Nudds, 2006, p. 14), conscious, voluntary 
and act ive (Boghossian, 2014, p. 2 f; McHugh; Way, 2018, p. 
168), domain-general and content-neutral (Hurley; Nudds, 
2006, p. 11), and – pace Boghossian (2014, p. 3) – often even 
“effortful and demanding.”
Another point worth emphasizing is that any train of 
thought, however loosely connected or wildly associative 
it might be, may count as thinking, whereas reasoning cru-
cially turns on the (type of) transition between mental con-
tents. Only if those transitions are rule-guided, we may sp eak 
of reasoning. This restriction, of course, does not preclude 
flawed or incorrect reasoning. We need to make room for the 
possibility of (correctly) following the wrong rules as well as 
following (appropriate) rules incorrectly in reasoning. It just 
needs to be possible to reflect on any given transition in rea-
soning to double-check whether a given rule was followed 
correctly and whether the applied rule is appropriate for the 
resp ective situation and purpose at hand.
To put it in terms of Wittgenstein’s important distinc-
tion: We can only sp eak of reasoning if a cognizer is following 
a rule, while thinking may proceed either merely according to 
a rule or even be chaotic in a way that does not reveal any 
consistent pattern of mental transition at all.
3. The Private Reasoning 
Argument (PRA)
In a next step, after the distinction between thinking and 
reasoning and the argumentative structure of PLA are suffi-
ciently clear, we can now apply what we have so far to the do-
main of language and the mind – or, more precisely, to reason-
ing – by presenting what I call the Private Reasoning Argument:
PRA: The Private Reasoning Argument11
R1* Reasoning is a rule-guided mental act ivity which 
consists (inter alia) in following inference rules.12
R2* Reasoning is only possible for someone who can ac-
cess and apply inference rules.
R3* Inference rules can only be accessed and applied by 
someone who can draw a distinction between correct and in-
correct applications of a rule.13
R4* A distinction between correct and incorrect appli-
cations of a rule can only be drawn by someone who has ac-
cess to publicly available correctness conditions.
R5* Only language (viz. public language) is fit to provide 
access to publicly available correctness conditions.14
R6 Only language allows drawing the distinction be-
tween correct and incorrect applications of a rule. [via hypo-
thetical syllogism from R4 and R5].
R7 Only language provides access to inference rules. [via 
hypothetical syllogism from R3 and R6].
R8 Reasoning is only possible for someone who has a 
language. [via hypothetical syllogism from R2 and R7].
R9 Therefore, reasoning is not available without lan-
guage. [logically equivalent with R8].
R5 claims that nothing but language could provide access 
to publicly accessible correctness conditions (for inference 
rules). This crucial assumption calls for independent back-
up, which will be provided in the following section 4. Before 
we come to this, note one striking dissimilarity between PLA 
and PRA: While PLA leads to the conclusion that a private 
language cannot exist, PRA does not conclude in saying that 
there cannot be private reasoning. This conclusion, however, 
can be easily derived from the charact erization of reasoning 
in R1 together with the basic Wittgensteinian insight that 
we cannot follow a rule in private (i.e. the rule-following con-
straint), which fuels PLA as well as PRA. With this presump-
tion, a derivation of the impossibility of private reasoning is 
10 The analogy between the kind of correctness conditions of interest at this point and validity is crucial. Truth conditions are, of course, 
also a kind of correctness conditions. But thinking of correctness conditions for reasoning in terms of truth conditions instead of validity 
conditions would be a mistake.
11 The asterisk (*) marks assumptions.
12 As McHugh; Way (2018, p. 184) would specify “[i]n a slogan, reasoning is rule-following that aims at fittingness.” For the purpose at 
hand, however, it is only important that rule-following is necessary for reasoning. Whatever characteristics besides rule-following may 
be needed to be sufficient for reasoning is irrelevant in this context.
13 The ability to apply inference rules and distinguish correct from incorrect applications of a rule need not be flawless, but at least a 
general awareness of the fact that rules can be applied correctly or incorrectly is required for someone to count as a reasoner.
14 Or, equivalently: Publicly available correctness conditions (for inference) can only be accessed linguistically.
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trivial: If we cannot follow a rule in private, we also cannot 
reason in private, since reasoning is following inference rules.
4. Why only language?
The argument for the claim that only language posses-
sion enables reasoning (by providing access to publicly avail-
able correctness conditions, as R5 has it) is, in a nutshell, that 
no other plausible candidate is available to do the job. In order 
to provide access to correctness conditions/inference rules, a 
medium must be fine-grained enough to allow for a precise 
formulation of the rules/conditions in question. In order to 
do so, sensitivity to intensional contexts and the availability 
of intersubjectively accessible communication are necessary.15
4.1 The External World
Being sensitive to intensional contexts is required be-
cause lines of reasoning (which may be expressed in argu-
ments) are sensitive to intensional contexts as well. There-
fore, no medium which does not exhibit this sensitivity 
could possibly be fit to take the role we reserved for lan-
guage, i.e. providing access to correctness conditions. This 
especially excludes reality itself as providing us with ac-
cess to correctness conditions for reasoning. Reality is not 
sensitive to e.g. different descriptions of one and the same 
thing or state of affair. Reality is indifferent to my depict-
ing one and the same person as either ‘the 45th president 
of the United States’ or ‘the worst president of the United 
States ever.’ But in reasoning this difference can be crucial, 
since ‘He will not be reelected, because he is the 45th presi-
dent of the US’ is not an inference of the same quality and 
plausibility as ‘He will not be reelected, because he is the 
worst president of the US ever’.
These kinds of differences must be captured by a me-
dium which can provide access to correctness conditions for 
reasoning. The external world, viz. reality, however, is not 
sensitive to intensionality in the relevant resp ect. It proba-
bly does not even make sense to call reality “intensional” or 
“extensional,” since these predicates seem to be applicable to 
representational systems only. Saying that reality or the ex-
ternal world is (sensitive to) intensional (contexts) most likely 
amounts to a category mistake. However, since nothing could 
possibly provide access to correctness conditions for reason-
ing without being (sensitive to) intensional (contexts), reality 
is ruled out, regardless of the question whether the statement 
“reality is intensional” is false or nonsensical.
One way to make sense of the idea that reality 
might be (sensitive to) intensional (contexts) is to make 
use of a Lagadonian language (Lewis, 1986, p. 145 f ). In a 
Lagadonian language (with a Lagadonian interpretation) 
everything simply serves as a sign of itself. This way we can 
regard reality as a representational system, and it seems 
entirely legitimate to ask whether a Lagadonian language 
(qua representational system) is sensitive to intensionality. 
A Lagadonian language (with a Lagadonian interpreta-
tion) is purely extensional, so this move does not help with 
getting access to correctness conditions. But we can give 
the question whether reality is (sensitive to) intensional 
(contexts) a sensible reading.16
This also proves that communicative attempts such as 
pointing to e.g. things or events in order to fix an inference 
relation between certain occurrences pointed to is too coarse-
grained for reasoning because different descriptions of what 
was pointed to can affect the quality of the reasoning involved. 
We need a more sophisticated medium which allows us to have 
access to correctness conditions for reasoning. The most plau-
sible candidate to accomplish this, apart from language and re-
ality, surely is some kind of mental representation.
4.2 Mental Representations
Mental representations are undoubtedly sensitive 
to intensionality, but the trouble with mental representa-
tions (even if this does not hold for their contents; see note 
21) is that they do not seem to be publicly available – viz. 
they are private – and therefore cannot accommodate the 
rule-following constraint.17 Although it is clear that mental 
representation is necessary for reasoning, no combination of 
mental representations or transition from one representation 
to another, as long as they are unaided by language, could con-
stitute reasoning. This is because, besides intensionality, the 
availability of intersubjectively accessible communication is 
needed as well. Mental representations as private entities are 
therefore unable to provide access to correctness conditions, 
which is required for reasoning.
This holds true even if we assume that mental repre-
sentation, and thereby our vehicle for thought, already is 
language-like from the outset. Let us consider Mentalese, the 
15 Davidson (2001) follows a similar argumentative strategy in some respects, but I am far from agreeing with his conclusions. One reason 
for our disagreement is probably that I am significantly more optimistic regarding the prospects of de re belief ascription. For more 
differences between Donald Davidson’s and my account, see section 6. The list of options to be considered in this section is not exhaus-
tive. Possible candidates such as mental maps (Camp, 2007) or unstructured propositions – e.g. propositions as functions from possible 
worlds to truth values, or as sets of possible worlds (King, 2017); in contrast to Fregean and Russellian propositions as exponents of 
structured propositions – are not discussed due to restricted length of this article. However, considerations similar to those mentioned 
in sections 4.2 and 4.3 also apply to these omitted alternatives.
16 I wish to thank Frank Hofmann for pointing me to David Lewis’ discussion of the Lagadonian language.
17 Mind premises R3 and R4, or just substitute “private representations” for “a private language” in L5 to see that mental representa-
tions are ruled out by the rule-following constraint.
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alleged “language” thought:18 If Mentalese is not a public lan-
guage – as Jerry Fodor (2008, p. 80) himself suggests – it does 
not even count as a possible language, following the conclusion 
of PLA. If Mentalese (assuming that it actually exists) should 
turn out to be a public language, on the other hand, it can pro-
vide the required access to correctness conditions and infer-
ence rules, and the conclusion of PRA holds true because the 
so-called “language” of thought is a real, i.e. public, language.19
4.3 Fregean Senses
The last candidate for providing access to correctness 
conditions for reasoning, apart from language, to be consid-
ered here are Fregean propositions. Since Fregean proposi-
tions, i.e. senses or thoughtsF,
20 are “capable of being the com-
mon property of several thinkers” (Frege, 1960, p. 62 n), they 
may avoid the problems we encountered with mental repre-
sentations due to their privacy.21 But even Fregean proposi-
tions need to be grasp ed “in an individual psychological act” 
(Putnam, 1975, p. 134) before they can be of any use for us in 
reasoning, which again leaves us only with (private) mental 
representations to operate with for a reasoner.
Even if we ignore this asp ect and suppose that a reasoner 
can directly operate on Fregean senses without the need for 
a mediating mental representation thereof, Fregean proposi-
tions are still not fit to provide access to correctness condi-
tions for reasoning. This is because Fregean senses fall prey 
to the rule-following constraint. Unaided by language for 
identifying and communicating individual steps in a line of 
reasoning, Fregean propositions by themselves do not allow 
for publicly accessible re-identification or double-checking 
on the legitimacy of inferential transitions between them. 
To achieve these features, we are cast back to language again, 
which is, as claimed before, the only medium fit to warrant 
publicly available access to correctness conditions, which in 
turn is necessary for reasoning.
5. Linguistic Relativity
PRA’s conclusion (i.e. propositions R8 or R9) may be re-
formulated by saying that language is constitutive for reason-
ing. But language is not constitutive in the sense that it fixes 
the correctness conditions needed for reasoning. This would 
open the gates for the worst kind of linguistic relativity, since it 
might be the case that each language fixes different correctness 
conditions for reasoning. The correctness conditions for rea-
soning are, however, not dependent on any individual language 
and are therefore not language-relative. What language does 
provide is not the correctness conditions themselves, but access 
to correctness conditions which are fixed independently of any 
individual language. So, every language provides access to the 
very same correctness conditions, although different languages 
may provide this access in slightly different ways.
Although there is no difference among languages re-
garding which correctness conditions they provide access 
to, there may be differences regarding how this access is pro-
vided. Some correctness conditions might be provided more 
transparently in one language than in another. To illustrate 
such a possibility, we can take a look at the following, very 
bad argument:
1. Only man is rational.
2. No woman is a man.
∴ 3. No woman is rational.
This fallacy obviously turns on an equivocation of the 
term “man,” which occurs with the same meaning as “human 
being” in the first premise and with the same meaning as “male 
(adult) human being” in the second premise. This equivocation 
cannot be reproduced e.g. in German, since there is no German 
expression for the middle term with a corresponding ambigui-
ty. So, the flaw in this reasoning is even more striking if we were 
to formulate the argument in German rather than in English.
The message to take from this example is of course not 
that German is generally superior in how it provides access to 
correctness conditions. The previous example was arbitrarily 
chosen, and a different example might have come out just the 
other way round by illuminating a flaw that is more readily 
detected or avoided in English than in German. The lesson to 
learn is that a line of reasoning is correct or incorrect in any 
language because the correctness or incorrectness of a line of 
reasoning is not dependent on the language which is used to 
express the reasoning in question. But different expressions of 
the same line of reasoning in different languages can some-
times highlight or obscure flaws in their resp ective formula-
tions of an argument/line of reasoning.
In this sense, Whorf ’s (1956, p. 214) tentative suggestion 
to make oneself “familiar with very many widely different lin-
guistic systems” is reasonable, but not because a monolingual 
individual is “constrained to certain modes of [reasoning]”22
(Whorf, 1956, p. 214). The plausibility of Whorf ’s sugges-
tion rather comes from the fact that some flaws in reason-
ing might in some languages be more readily detected than 
18 Some people might object at this point that presupposing a language of thought would beg the question in an investigation of the 
relation between thought and language, but bear with me for the moment.
19 For considerations regarding the possibility that a person’s language of thought is just the same as a person’s public language, e.g. 
English, see Devitt (2006, p. 148 ff).
20 Not in the Cartesian sense introduced in section 2, but thoughts in the Fregean sense.
21 Fregean or Russellian propositions may be considered as the contents of mental representations, i.e. what mental representations 
represent. The crucial point is that mental representations are private although their content might be publicly available.
22 Whorf originally talks about interpretation, not reasoning.
Hannes Fraissler
54Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 22(1):48-58, jan/apr 2021 
in others – as in the example above where German does not 
allow for the fatal equivocation because there is no German 
term available with a corresponding ambiguity. A monolin-
gual English sp eaker is of course nonetheless able to detect the 
equivocation on her own without the need to ask a sp eaker of 
German for help or take recourse to German language pat-
terns. Consequentially, this example is far from suggesting any 
noteworthy restrictions in reasoning or conceptual systems 
due to one language in comparison to another. The outcome 
that reasoning (constitutively) depends on language therefore 
cannot be used to support claims of linguistic relativity.
Theories of linguistic relativity deserve a far more detailed 
discussion than can be provided here. I therefore do not claim 
that linguistic relativity can be refuted on the basis of these few 
remarks, although I am convinced that most accounts of lin-
guistic relativity are deeply flawed and often radically overem-
phasize the allegedly all-pervading effect of different languages 
on our mental life. To mention only one problem, many – al-
though not all (Gumperz; Levinson, 1996, p. 1) – accounts of 
linguistic relativity suffer from: Linguistic relativity theorists 
are frequently tempted to amalgamate language and culture 
in their notion of language.23 As a consequence, the linguistic 
relativist’s claim that “the particular language we sp eak influ-
ences the way we think about reality” (Lucy, 1997, p. 291) often 
amounts to the truism that our thinking is affected by our lin-
guistic-cum-cultural situation. This should hardly come out as a 
surprise, given that our cultural situation comprises all asp ects 
of our education and upbringing. Theoreticians who tend to 
use such an amalgamated notion of language therefore owe us 
an argument that their theories have anything to do with an 
actually linguistic impact on thought, independent of cultural 
effects in a broader sense.24
However, ignoring the intricacies of linguistic relativity 
here can be justified by pointing out that theories of linguistic 
relativity crucially differ in focus from the present investiga-
tion. I am concerned with the question how thinking/reason-
ing is dependent on (having a) language per se, i.e. what Lucy 
(1997, p. 292) calls the “semiotic level.” Linguistic relativity, on 
the other hand, primarily makes claims about cognitive effects 
of sp eaking one language rather than another – Lucy’s “struc-
tural level” (Lucy, 1997, p. 292) – while it usually has little to 
say about differences in thought resulting from sp eaking any 
language in contrast to none at all (Enfield et al., 2014, p. 8). 
These questions are sometimes not even clearly distinguished 
and consequently get confused in pertinent inquiries, which 
makes the theoretical underpinning of alleged achievements 
in studies of linguistic relativity appear rather dim in many 
cases. Regarding this investigation, however, the question how 
different languages affect thought is of secondary interest. The 
preconditions for reasoning and the cognitive differences be-
tween linguistic and non-linguistic individuals are the central 
focus of the inquiry at hand.
6. Verificationist Concerns
The discussion above, and probably esp ecially the repeat-
ed emphasis of the rule-following constraint, might raise (anti-)
verificationist concerns in some readers. This is esp ecially rea-
sonable because Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument 
was repeatedly accused of building on verificationist principles 
early on in the literature (e.g. Thomson, 1964). Since “verifi-
cationism” is a quite elastic term, it is hard to counter every 
accusation which might come under this label in one sweep. 
But the argumentation presented here is at least not guilty of 
a version of verificationism which clearly needs to be rejected. 
If the claims defended here turn on verificationist principles at 
all, then it is a very mild form of verificationism which can be 
accepted, or so I wish to argue in this section.
Without giving a precise definition of what makes a ver-
ificationist position untenable or acceptable, the difference 
can be depicted for our purposes by considering so-called 
Robinson cases.25 A version of the Private Language Argument 
with the consequence that a lonely islander like Robinson 
Crusoe (who never meets Friday) could not learn, sp eak, or 
understand a language because he lacks contact with a lin-
guistic community would clearly turn on an untenable ver-
ificationist principle. The same holds mutatis mutandis for 
the Private Reasoning Argument. If it follows from PRA that 
Robinson cannot reason because no one is present to talk 
about his inferences with Robinson, then PRA would need 
to be rejected for unacceptable verificationist commitments. 
However, nothing like this follows from the arguments pre-
sented here.
To show this, we can consider Donald Davidson’s sug-
gestion to extend Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument 
in a way similar to my approach. Davidson writes:
I believe that Wittgenstein put us on the 
track of the only possible answer to this 
question [regarding the source of the con-
cept of truth]. The source of the concept of 
objective truth is interpersonal communica-
23 Sometimes this happens implicitly; sometimes the mingling is explicitly endorsed as unavoidable (Ahearn, 2017, p. xiii, xiv, 8, 20 f, 
32, 56, 73, 92 f, 112, 116). I take this to be misguided, and wholeheartedly subscribe to the statement that “[o]bviously, to even pose 
the question as to whether language and culture are related, there must be a sense in which the two can be distinguished” (Enfield et 
al., 2014, p. 13).
24 This point is also repeatedly emphasized by McWhorter (2014, p. 139), who insists that the allegedly demonstrated effects of lan-
guage-and-culture on thought come from culture (McWhorter, 2014, p. 12, 81 f, 103) or environment (McWhorter, 2014, p. 18 f), but 
not from language.
25 An early account of discussing Robinson cases in connection with the Private Language Argument can be found in Ayer and Rhees 
(1954), where many of the mistakes pointed out below are committed.
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tion. Thought depends on communication. 
This follows at once if we suppose that lan-
guage is essential to thought, and we agree 
with Wittgenstein that there cannot be a 
private language. [Footnote omitted] The 
central argument against private language 
is that unless a language is shared there is 
no way to distinguish between using the lan-
guage correctly and using it incorrectly; only 
communication with another can supply an 
objective check. If only communication can 
provide a check on the correct use of words, 
only communication can supply a standard of 
objectivity in other domains, as we shall see. 
We have no grounds for crediting a creature 
with the distinction between what is thought 
to be the case and what is the case unless 
the creature has the standard provided by a 
shared language; and without this distinction 
there is nothing that can clearly be called 
thought (Davidson, 1991, p. 157).
This passage might, at first glance, appear very similar to 
what I argue for. But there are subtle, albeit absolutely crucial, 
differences between Davidson’s and my account. A rather 
superficial difference is that Davidson talks about truth and 
thought (notably belief) while I talk about (inferential) cor-
rectness and reasoning. Although important, this is not the 
most crucial difference to be considered here. What is more 
important is that Davidson’s formulation suggests that ac-
tual interpersonal communication is required for truth and 
thought and that only an actually shared language is a pub-
lic, and therefore possible, language. If the quoted paragraph 
above does not merely suffer from consistently careless word-
ing, what Davidson expresses in this passage is verificationism 
par excellence. This conception seems to make it impossible 
for (our version of) Robinson Crusoe to use language or even 
think, since there is no one he could actually communicate 
or share a language with. I take this result to be intuitively as 
well as theoretically unacceptable, just as unacceptable as the 
apparently underlying variety of verificationism.
This kind of verificationism, however, is easily avoided. 
What needs to be done is to change the requirement that ac-
tual communication happens and that a language is actually 
shared, to the requirement that communication is possible and 
that a language can be shared. The correct modality for those 
requirements is possibility, not actuality. Davidson seems to 
wrongly assume “(…) that unless a language is shared there 
is no way to distinguish between using the language correctly 
and using it incorrectly” (Davidson, 1991, p. 157; emphasis 
added). What Davidson should have said is that unless a lan-
guage can be shared, there is no way to distinguish between 
using the language correctly and using it incorrectly. A private 
language is not a language that is not shared, but a language 
that cannot be shared.
Davidson also incorrectly extends the rationale behind 
the Private Language Argument to the entire domain of 
thought, including beliefs. The consequence of this move is 
that, according to Davidson, a pre- or non-linguistic creature 
cannot have beliefs, because
(…) to have a belief it is not enough to dis-
criminate among aspects of the world, to 
behave in different ways in different circum-
stances [...]. Having a belief demands in addi-
tion appreciating the contrast between true 
belief and false, between appearance and 
reality, mere seeming and being. [...] Some-
one who has a belief about the world—or 
anything else—must grasp the concept of 
objective truth (Davidson, 1991, p. 156 f),
which in turn is only possible with language, because 
“communication is the source of objectivity” (Davidson, 
1991, p. 157 n) and “without communication propositional 
thought is impossible” (Davidson, 1991, p. 160). This seems 
much too demanding, for it is implausible that merely having 
beliefs requires conceptual sophistication of such a high de-
gree. Believing something does not require language, nor does 
it depend on rule-following. Although we can legitimately 
talk about correctness conditions of beliefs, I do not need to 
be able (even in principle) to check for the correctness (i.e. 
truth) of a belief in order to have that belief. An extension of 
the rule-following requirement to (having) beliefs and other 
kinds of thinking which are not reasoning is therefore illegiti-
mate. This means that I can have a belief – and what I believe 
might be either true or false – despite my inability to indi-
viduate the belief, discriminate it from other (maybe similar) 
beliefs, or re-identify said belief on later occasions.
Since I do not share any of the verificationist motives 
arguably present in Davidson’s account, and since nothing like 
this follows from the arguments presented and defended here, 
I think that verificationist concerns regarding my position are 
unfounded. I am, however, committed to a stance towards 
reasoning which might be called “restricted and mildly veri-
ficationist”. Reasoning, in contrast to having beliefs and other 
kinds of thinking, does require the possibility of an objective 
check of the mental transitions made. This plausibly also re-
quires the capacity to individuate and re-identify mental con-
tents, an ability not needed for thinking. If this amounts to a 
verificationist commitment, then there are (mild) versions of 
verificationism which can, indeed even need to, be accepted 
for restricted domains. Reasoning is a much more demanding 
capacity than mere thinking, and reasoning consequentially 
presupposes a more sophisticated cognitive apparatus. The 
ability to have thoughts about thoughts, or – as Bermúdez 
(2003) calls it – intentional ascent,26 certainly is a precondi-
26 According to Bermúdez (2003), intentional ascent requires semantic ascent, and thereby language. Bermúdez’ conclusions are there-
fore to a considerable extent quite similar to mine, although our argumentative routes differ significantly.
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tion for being able to reason. Yet it needs to be clearly empha-
sized that by far not all mental phenomena, notably having 
beliefs and other kinds of thinking which are not reasoning, 
are so demanding.
7. No Non-Linguistic 
Reasoners?
Since reasoning constitutively depends on language, no 
non- or pre-linguistic being is able to reason. But obviously 
not every kind of thought depends on language in this way. 
Where and how exactly the line between language-depen-
dent cognitive processes and language-independent cognitive 
processes needs to be drawn exceeds the scope of this contri-
bution. Nonetheless, it seems pretty clear that not every kind 
of thought is dependent on language, since non-linguistic an-
imals and pre-linguistic infants clearly have thoughts in the 
broad sense sketched in section 2. Also many experiences are 
language-independent and can therefore be had by all sorts of 
conscious beings even if they clearly lack language.
It may also be worth pointing out that a lack of language 
does not imply a complete lack of communicative abilities. 
It should go without saying that a plethora of sp ecies com-
municate without possessing anything that comes even close 
to language. Also human communication is not entirely lin-
guistic, as can be seen from e.g. so-called body “language”.27 It 
is important to keep these truisms in mind when we try to 
evaluate how plausible or convincing the position presented 
here might be. However, a clear consequence of PRA is that 
non-linguistic individuals – although they can think, believe, 
feel, and have experiences – cannot possibly be said to reason, 
since they lack a constitutive element of reasoning. In other 
words, there are no pre- or non-linguistic reasoners.
Still, it needs to be emphasized that this does not nec-
essarily mean that there is no non-linguistic reasoning. This 
caveat is neatly brought to light by Martine Nida-Rümelin 
(2010), who clearly distinguishes two questions: “(Q1) Is it 
possible for a creature without a language to [reason]? (Can 
non-linguistic creatures [reason]?) […] (Q2) Is it possible to 
[reason] without thereby using a language?” (Nida-Rümelin, 
2010, p. 55 f).28
While it clearly follows from PRA that (Q1) needs to 
be answered in the negative, the same answer is not necessar-
ily implied for (Q2). (Q2) should be read as asking whether 
linguistic creatures can reason without employing language. 
This possibility is not ruled out by PRA, given the inter-
pretation argued for in section 6. The mildly verificationist 
principle adopted there merely demands that it be possible 
to communicate a line of thought, for it to qualify as reason-
ing. This is compatible with a non-linguistically framed line 
of reasoning, as long as it can be put in language in order to 
be communicated and (re-)evaluated. In this way we have a 
clear sense in which non-linguistic creatures cannot reason, 
while there still might be non-linguistic reasoning. But even if 
there might be non-linguistic reasoning, it is not available to 
non-linguistic creatures.
If it is true that non-linguistic creatures are unable to 
reason, how are we to account for the sometimes impressive 
cognitive achievements and problem-solving abilities in the 
(non-human) animal world? Some clarifications are in order 
before this question can be seriously considered. First of all, 
the claim that there are no pre- or non-linguistic reasoners is 
not equivalent with the claim that there are no non-human 
reasoners. At least conceptually, the domains of humans and 
reasoners do not coincide, insofar as neither notion – i.e. being 
human and being able to reason – is implied by the other. To 
be a human being is not sufficient for being a reasoner since 
pre-linguistic infants are not among the reasoners, although 
they clearly belong to the human sp ecies. Moreover, sp eaking 
non-human creatures could perfectly well be capable of rea-
soning, so being human is also not necessary for reasoning.
The most prominent case of animal reasoning in the 
history of philosophy is probably the story about Chrysippus’ 
dog: A dog, hunting its prey, comes to a tripartite crossroad. 
The prey must have taken one of the three pathways. The dog 
sniffs at the first path but does not pick up the prey’s scent. So 
the dog sniffs at the second road and, again, does not smell 
the quarry. The hunting dog therefore rushes down the third 
path without even sniffing for the prey in this direction. This 
scenario is supposed to suggest that the dog reasoned as fol-
lows: the prey must have taken one of the three roads; it did 
not take the first; and it did not take the second; thus it took 
the third. Reasoning along these lines constitutes full-blown 
reasoning indeed, since it is an instance of following a disjunc-
tive syllogism. But according to the position defended here, a 
dog (given that it does not have language) could not engage 
in reasoning at all; so it could not possibly reason through a 
disjunctive syllogism.
The story of Chrysippus’ dog is an ancient philosophi-
cal problem case and provoked various react ions. Some phi-
losophers were happy to ascribe reasoning to animals, while 
others tried to defuse the story of Chrysippus’ dog in several 
ways without conceding deductive capacities to animals. I 
will neither discuss traditional react ions to Chrysippus’ dog, 
nor will I develop a new account. I just wish to cite Rescor-
la (2009), who presents a solution to Chrysippus’ dog which 
allows an explanation of the dog’s behavior (and cognitive 
27 I add scare quotes here because I am not prepared to accept body language as a language in the literal sense. Body language is 
without any doubt a means of communication, but what is communicated in this regard cannot be considered as linguistically coded 
information – except for cases where a message is conveyed on the basis of an established code. But then we do not speak about body 
language, but sign languages which are proper, full-blown languages (Ahearn, 2017, p. 45 f).
28 The expression “think” was changed to “reason” in this quote.
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achievement) without attributing deductive reasoning to 
the animal. This is done, in short, by constructing a Bayes-
ian probabilistic decision model, operating on mental maps. 
Leaving the intricate technical details aside, we can conclude 
with Rescorla (2009, p. 67) that “a satisfying treatment of 
Chrysippus’ dog need not cite logical reasoning over logically 
structured mental states” because “[t]he relevant processes, 
grounded in Bayesian decision theory, differ markedly from 
deduction” (Rescorla, 2009, p. 71). This means that we can 
provide a model that predicts the dog’s behavior without at-
tributing cognitive capacities to the dog it cannot have, ac-
cording to my account, without possessing language. Since 
language and reasoning are not necessary to explain the dog’s 
behavior, Chrysippus’ dog is defused as a counterargument 
against PRA. Having the cognitive abilities to act according 
to (without following) a Bayesian model is sufficient to ex-
plain Chrysippus’ dog, but does not require that Chrysippus’ 
dog is able to reason, e.g. by drawing a disjunctive syllogism. 
Rescorla’s (2009, p. 58) “Bayesian-com-cartographic model of 
Chrysippus’ dog” can explain what happens in the story and 
“countenances non-linguistic cognition while sharply distin-
guishing it from linguistic cognition” (Rescorla, 2009, p. 53). 
In other words, Rescorla (2009) satisfactorily explains Chry-
sippus’ dog without positing that the animal is able to draw 
deductive inferences, which is a kind of reasoning and would 
therefore require language possession. Although the cognitive 
model to explain Chrysippus’ dog might be quite complex, it 
merely calls for cognitive processes which are in agreement 
with (e.g. Bayesian probabilistic) rules, in contrast to cognitive 
processes which constitute rule-following. Complex cognitive 
models are needed anyway to explain most mental processes 
which are language-independent, e.g. visual processing. What 
is crucial here is that rule-following is not needed to exempli-
fy these models. Therefore, the non-linguistic cognitive pro-
cesses displayed by Chrysippus’ dog can be executed uncon-
sciously (i.e. on the sub-personal level) and do not contradict 
the claim that reasoning, which is conscious, is language-de-
pendent.29
Conclusion
With these results at hand, we can steer for a more con-
vincing middle course to navigate between the Scylla of the 
conduit metaphor30 and the Charybdis of linguistic relativity, 
thereby approximating a more adequate understanding of the 
relation between mind and language. A naïve conduit met-
aphor can be ruled out on the basis of PRA, since if reason-
ing constitutively depends on language, it is not the case that 
language merely serves to communicate preformed mental 
content. Regarding linguistic relativity, the current state of 
scientific investigation, based on several elaborately designed 
empirical experiments, strongly indicates that the difference 
in cognitive effect between different (human) languages is at 
best marginal (McWhorter, 2014, p. xiv, 84, 106).
In conclusion, we have at least a partial answer to the 
question how the mind relates to language: Language is not 
necessary in order to think, but the difference between having 
and not having a language amounts (at least) to the difference 
between being a possible reasoner and not being a reasoner at 
all. That said, it is a live option that not all reasoning necessar-
ily needs to be carried out in language.
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